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Abstract
The economic crisis was initially associated with an increase in regional and local government 
payment periods and trade debt. Since 2012, central government has approved various 
extraordinary mechanisms for the payment of local and regional government suppliers that 
have signifi cantly reduced the stock of trade debt and the average supplier-payment periods 
attributable to these levels of government. Successive plans have helped unblock payments 
and channel funds of close to €67 billion towards the private sector in somewhat less than 
three years. And against a background of economic weakness, fi scal consolidation and 
diffi cult conditions of access to lending, it is believed this has provided a considerable 
impetus to activity that has helped mitigate some of the adverse effects of the economic 
crisis. In parallel, the roll-out of the plan has entailed a substantial increase in local and 
regional government debt vis-à-vis the State. To prevent inappropriate incentives for the 
conduct of local and regional government from arising, the funding mechanisms agreed on 
require compliance with certain adjustment plans.
Keywords: trade debt, payment to government suppliers, regional and local public fi nances, 
public spending.
JEL classifi cation: E6, H12, H74, H81.
Resumen
La crisis económica estuvo asociada inicialmente a un incremento de los plazos de pago y 
de la deuda comercial de las Administraciones Territoriales. Desde 2012 la Administración 
Central ha aprobado distintos mecanismos extraordinarios para el pago a proveedores 
de CCAA y CCLL, que han reducido de forma signifi cativa el stock de deuda comercial 
y el período medio de pago a proveedores de estas Administraciones. Los sucesivos 
planes han permitido desbloquear pagos y canalizar fondos hacia el sector privado por 
un total de cerca de 67 mm de euros en algo menos de tres años, que, en un contexto 
de debilidad económica, consolidación fi scal y difi cultades de acceso al crédito, se estima 
han generado un estímulo signifi cativo sobre la actividad, que habría ayudado a mitigar 
algunos de los efectos negativos de la crisis económica. En paralelo, la implementación del 
plan ha supuesto un incremento importante del endeudamiento de las CCAA y CCLL con 
el Estado. Para evitar que se generen incentivos inadecuados para las Administraciones 
Territoriales, los mecanismos de fi nanciación acordados exigen el cumplimiento de unos 
planes de ajuste. 
Palabras clave: deuda comercial, pago a proveedores de las AAPP, fi nanzas públicas 
regionales y locales, gasto público.
Códigos JEL: E6, H12, H74, H81.
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1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis has had a most adverse effect on Spanish general government 
fi nances, taking the form of a signifi cant increase in the budget defi cit and public debt. One 
phenomenon associated with this deterioration in public fi nances has been the signifi cant 
increase in the time taken by general government to pay its suppliers and, therefore, in its trade 
debt. In particular, the total amount of consolidated general government payment obligations 
outstanding,1 an accounting item that enables this type of debt to be approximated, amounted to 
€87.3 billion in 2011 (8.1% of GDP), according to the fi nancial accounts of the Spanish economy, 
compared with €57.1 billion in 2007 (5.3% of GDP). The increase in trade debt over this period was 
extensive to all tiers of government, albeit concentrated most in local and regional government. 
Thus almost 75% of total trade debt in 2011 related to regional and local government. 
Given this situation, Spain adopted various measures from 2012 geared to reducing 
local and regional government trade debt volumes, as part of the three phases of the so-called 
supplier payment plan and through the amounts made available by the regional government 
liquidity fund (Fondo de Liquidez Autonómica – “FLA” by its Spanish abbreviation) for payments 
to suppliers. At the same time, new regulations aimed at structurally reducing the time taken by 
general government to pay its suppliers have been approved.
These policies have had a signifi cant impact on the stock of trade debt and the average 
supplier payment period. Hence, the consolidated general government payment obligations 
outstanding in 2013 stood at €58.7 billion (5.6% of GDP), signifi cantly down on the 2011 fi gure. 
The reduction is apparently concentrated at the regional and local government level, whose 
weight in total outstanding general government payment obligations fell to around 50%. Also, 
on the data recently provided by the Ministry of Finance and General Government (“MHAP” 
by its Spanish abbreviation), the average payment period for supplier invoices issued between 
January and November 2014 was around 58 days and 27 days for regional government and 
local government, respectively, i.e. lower levels than observed in previous years. 
These developments in general government trade credit in Spain may have exerted 
signifi cant effects on economic activity. Deferred payment is a standard practice in trade relations. 
However, an excessive lengthening of the payment period may have harmful effects on creditor 
companies, which are obliged to resort to alternative sources of fi nancing. In a setting of fi nancial 
constraints such as that seen during the crisis, these alternatives may not be available or their cost 
may be very high. Countering this, the trade debt-reducing measures implemented have entailed 
an injection of liquidity for households and fi rms, against a backdrop of widespread economic 
weakness, fi scal consolidation and diffi culties for economic agents in gaining access to credit. 
1  Consolidated payment obligations are referred to throughout this paper, that is, outstanding debt of government units 
to other government units is excluded.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1501
The aim of this paper is to describe the extraordinary mechanisms for payments to 
suppliers developed in Spain in recent years and to quantify their impact, at least approximately. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the trend of general government 
accounts payable in Spain and in other European countries. Section 3 reviews the various 
policies implemented to reduce both the stock of trade debt and general government payment 
periods. Section 4 looks at the main channels through which these policies might exert an 
infl uence on the economy’s private sector and the potential effects are quantifi ed using various 
analytical instruments. Section 5 draws the main conclusions.
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2  Recent trend of general government accounts payable in Spain from an international 
perspective
The general government sector commonly uses private suppliers to provide public goods and 
services, and in doing so it incurs payment obligations with them under certain conditions. 
The payment of these obligations by general government, as in the case of the private sector, 
occasionally involves a time lag relative to when the services or goods were actually provided 
or delivered. Amounts whose payment has been deferred are statistically recorded in what are 
known as “accounts payable”. This trade debt forms part of total general government liabilities, 
although under European statistical standards it is not part of the public debt for the purposes 
of the Excessive Defi cit Protocol (EDP debt).2 In Spain’s case, the information on this debt is 
published by the Banco de España in its quarterly fi nancial accounts.3
From 1997 to 2007, in the upturn prior to the economic crisis, consolidated accounts 
payable stood in Spain at around 4% of GDP or 10% of total public expenditure in annual 
average terms. In comparative terms (see Chart 1), this fi gure was slightly below the average for 
other European countries, which nonetheless show high heterogeneity, ranging from practically 
zero in Germany to percentages of around 10% of GDP in France, refl ecting the different 
practices prevailing in relations between the general government sector and its suppliers in the 
different countries. 
In terms of agents, most outstanding payment obligations in Spain’s case were 
concentrated in local and regional government, which accounted for around 65% of such 
obligations in the 1997-2007 period, with somewhat more than 30% owed by regional 
government. By type of creditor, almost three-quarters of this debt was to non-fi nancial 
corporations and the remainder to households. 
A supplementary variable that allows for analysis of the volume of outstanding 
obligations is the average supplier payment period. According to data based on surveys of 
fi rms,4 the general government payment period differs substantially from one country to another 
(see Chart 2), both in relation to the usual contractual practices prevailing and to the average 
delays observed with respect to those practices. Specifi cally, prior to the crisis, the usual 
contractually stipulated general government payment period was around 80 days in the case of 
2  Non-recourse factoring and long-term trade credit are included in EDP debt.
3  Eurostat only publishes comparable cross-country data of the aggregate “Other accounts payable”. Data on accounts 
payable to non-fi nancial corporations and households are available for the Spanish general government sector. It should 
be borne in mind, however, that the defi nition of households includes sole proprietors. Moreover, the data for this 
distinction are based on estimates. Further, for each “Other accounts payable” fi gure, there is a breakdown into “Trade 
credits and advances” and “Other accounts receivable/payable, excluding trade credit and advances”. 
4  Source: Intrum Justitia. Written, national language survey conducted in 31 EU countries in the fi rst quarter of the year. 
In terms of company size, the sample (2014 wave) is made up as follows: 40% of the companies have fewer than 19 
employees, 27% between 20 and 49 employees, 27% between 50 and 249, 3% between 250 and 499, 2% between 
500 and 2,499, and 1% more than 2,500.
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Spain and Italy, while it stood at 31 days in Germany and the United Kingdom. According to the 
surveys, payment delays in relation to contractual commitments were especially high in Portugal 
and Italy, where they exceeded 80 and 60 days, respectively. In Spain’s case, these delays stood 
at around 30 days on average. 
The stocks of outstanding payment obligations of most EU countries generally tended 
to increase during the crisis. These increases were especially signifi cant in Spain and particularly 
in Portugal and Greece. Specifi cally, in the case of Spain, accounts payable reached 8% of 
GDP at end-2011. This increase was seen in all tiers of government and, accordingly, the 
accounts payable in that period reached 2.4% of GDP in central government, 3.4% of GDP in 
regional government and 2.1% of GDP in local government. The increase was in payables to 
both companies and households. The average delays in payments relative to the contractually 
agreed period are estimated to have increased by approximately 30 days compared with those 
before the crisis.
Against this backdrop, several countries, including Spain, Italy and Portugal, implemented 
plans in 2011 and 2012 to reduce their general government trade debt. In general, these plans 
have managed to reduce or stabilise the trade debt of these countries. In the specifi c case of 
Spain, the accounts payable of Spanish general government as a whole to other economic 
sectors (fi rms and households) stood in 2013 at around €58 billion (5.5% of GDP), a decrease 
of 2.5 percentage points (pp) of GDP relative to 2011, which was apparently concentrated in 
regional government (1.8% of GDP between 2013 and 2011) and local government (0.8% of 
GDP in the same period). This reduction seemingly occurred in payables to both non-fi nancial 
corporations and households (see Chart 3). The most recent data, relating to 2014 Q3, show 
that this trend has continued, taking the ratio of outstanding payment obligations down to 4.5%.
Although surveys of fi rms do not seem to show a signifi cant decrease in the average 
delay in payment in the last few years (see Chart 2), the information published by the MHAP5 
indicates that the average time taken to pay suppliers of State, regional and local governments 
as at 31 December 2012 was 60, 181 and 109 days, respectively, while the average payment 
period of supplier invoices issued between January and November 2014 is estimated at around 
11, 58 and 27 days for central government, regional government and local government, 
respectively.7 
5  See the MHAP website: http://www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/CDI/PMP/Paginas/PMPdelasgeneral government.aspx.
6  Several partial sources give a similar picture. More detailed information is available for the State (see the MHAP website: 
http://www.igae.pap.minhap.gob.es/sitios/igae/es-ES/informacionEconomica/Paginas/itplazospago.aspx). According 
to that information, the average payment period of this sub-sector was 38.5 days at end-2011, it increased to 60 
days in 2012 and it decreased to 30 days in 2013. The National Federation of the Self-Employed (the “ATA” by its 
Spanish abbreviation) regularly publishes the results of surveys of the self-employed (http://www.ata.es/), which show 
that the average payment periods of amounts owed to this group by the various general government units in December 
2012 stood at 69, 149 and 177 days for central government, regional government and local government, respectively, 
whereas in December 2014 these periods were 45, 106 and 74 days, respectively. Lastly, the economic consultancy 
group SIELOCAL (Sistema de Transparencia Económica Municipal – Municipal Economic Transparency System) 
publishes an annual report on the average payment period of local government, which fell from its peak of 122 days in 
2011 to 74 days in 2013 (http://www.sielocal.com/informe/327/Periodo-medio-de-pago).
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As described in detail in the next section, the various plans to reduce general government 
trade debt in Spain were fi nanced by the central government, which raised on the fi nancial 
markets the funds needed to pay the suppliers of regional and local government. The settlement 
of regional and local government payables under these plans has meant that these tiers of 
government have replaced their trade debt with debt to central government. Consequently, the 
EDP debt of regional and local government to the State tripled in the period 2012-2013, such 
that the percentage of regional government debt which is owed to the State increased from zero 
to 37% in September 2014 (see Chart 4). 
7  For an analysis of the implications of these operations for the debt of general government overall, as well as for the State, 
regional and local governments, see Gordo et al. (2013 and 2014).
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3 Measures to reduce trade debt in Spain
Since early 2012 the central government has applied several measures to mitigate the liquidity problems 
of regional and local government. Thus, in response to the resolutions of the Fiscal and Financial 
Policy Council (Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera, the “CPFF” by its Spanish abbreviation) of 
17 January 2012, two courses of action were undertaken. Firstly, in relation to the regional fi nancing 
system, the system of advanced payments and deferrals on account8 was modifi ed. Secondly, the 
2012 ICO-regional government facility9 was set up to cover two tranches: one intended to provide 
regional governments with funds to meet their payment obligations associated with maturities of 
regional government fi nancial debt incurred before 1 January 2012 and maturing up to or on 30 June 
2012 (refi nancing tranche), and another relating to outstanding payments to suppliers.
Subsequently, Royal Decree-Law 4/2012 of 24 February 2012 established an 
extraordinary fi nancing plan for the payment of local government suppliers, which was later 
extended to regional governments. This plan set in place a temporary mechanism for the payment 
of certain trade accounts payable by local and regional governments as at December 2011. The 
plan was fi nanced by a syndicated loan10 taken out by the Supplier Payment Financing Fund 
(Fondo para la Financiación de Pago a Supplier, the “FFPP” by its Spanish abbreviation), created 
by the Government and 26 fi nancial institutions, and endowed with €30 billion, extendable to 
€35 billion. The FFPP came into being as a public law entity with legal personality and capacity 
to issue and raise funds on the markets.11 To draw on the FFPP, local and regional governments 
had to commit to an adjustment plan assessed by the MHAP.12 
Royal Decree-Law 4/2013 of 22 February 2013 gave rise to a second phase of the 
supplier payment mechanism, which regulated the inclusion of the governments and invoices 
excluded in the fi rst phase.13 It was endowed with around €2.6 billion, the amount remaining 
8   The central government undertook to: (1) shift forward to the fi rst half of 2012 50% of the estimated amount of the 2010 
fi nancing system settlements in favour of those regional governments which so request; (2) defer up to a maximum 
of 120 monthly instalments the outstanding amount of the negative settlements of the fi nancing system relating to 
2008 and 2009 for those regional governments which so request and which agree on an adjustment programme with 
the MHAP. The 2008 and 2009 settlements in favour of the State amounted to €5,922 million and €18,947 million, 
respectively, according to the MHAP.
9   It was set up in February 2012 to make special-purpose loans under which the ICO paid the fi nancial creditor directly. The 
maximum interest rate was referenced to the ICO’s cost of debt. Thus regional governments had to pay this interest rate 
plus the ICO’s fi nancial market search costs. However, the ICO’s search costs and its limited ability to obtain fi nancing on the 
markets meant that its borrowing conditions were worse than those of the fi nancing obtained by the Treasury (see González, 
2013). A total of €5,333 million of loans were granted (see ICO press release of 11 February 2013 reporting the 2012 results).
10  The syndicated loan was secured by a Treasury guarantee which in turn was secured by the share in State revenue of 
municipal and regional governments. The loan maturity initially set was 5 years, with a 2-year grace period. The cost 
for local and regional government is that of the syndicated loan plus operating costs of 0.3 pp and they had to repay 
the loan in 10 years with a 2-year grace period. These conditions are now softer for municipalities.
11  As stipulated in Royal Decree-Law 7/2012 of 9 March 2012. 
12  A favourable assessment of the adjustment plan entailed the transformation of the trade debt of local and regional 
governments into fi nancial debt to the State, while an unfavourable assessment or lack of an adjustment plan could 
entail retention of the share in State tax revenue.
13  Specifi cally, the expansion of the mechanism affected associations of municipalities, Navarre and Basque municipalities, 
and new types of contract (administrative licences, management contracts, agreements, property lease contracts and 
public-private sector cooperation contracts).
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from the FFPP’s initial endowment of €30 billion after deducting the amount of €27.4 billion fi nally 
used in 2012.14
Finally, in the fourth quarter of 2013 the third phase of the supplier payment plan was 
approved. It was implemented in two tranches, paid in November 2013 and February 2014, 
which extended not only the scope of the mechanism,15, 16 but also the time horizon of the 
outstanding payment obligations covered by it. Hence this could be used by local and regional 
governments to settle due and payable obligations to 31 May 2013. In total, the FFPP has, in 
its three phases between 2012 and 2014, paid €30.2 billion to regional governments and €11.6 
billion to local governments (see Table 1).
Simultaneously with the FFPP, the Government set in train a supplementary mechanism 
initially designed to provide liquidity to the regional governments so requesting. Its purpose 
was to cater for situations of strong need for fi nancing at times of tight credit. To this end, 
Royal Decree-Law 21/2012 of 13 July 2012 on general government liquidity measures set up 
the regional government liquidity fund (Fondo de Liquidez Autonómica – “FLA” by its Spanish 
abbreviation). This is a fund from which regional governments can voluntarily obtain funds, 
which from the outset has been fi nanced by Treasury debt issuance, so its cost is lower than 
that of the FFPP. Like the FFPP, the FLA directly services the security and loan maturities which 
regional governments are unable to refi nance. Since it was set up, nine regional governments 
have joined it.17 Despite its initial purpose, since the end of 2012 the FLA has devoted somewhat 
more than a quarter of its funds to paying outstanding invoices from suppliers, particularly those 
for works contracts, supplies and services, and health agreements and pharmacies. In total, 
between 2012 and 2014, the MHAP released €25.1 billion for supplier payments of regional 
governments belonging to the FLA (see Table 2).18
14  For more information see the presentation of the MHAP of 15 November 2013 (http://www.minhap.gob.es/
Documentacion/Publico/GabineteMinistro/Notas%20Prensa/2013/CONSEJO%20DE%20MINISTROS/15-11-13%20
Presentaci%c3%b3n%20Endeudamiento%20Supplier.pdf).
15  The fi rst tranche covered the following benefi ciaries: (i) health, education and social service agreements; (ii) cooperation 
agreements; (iii) transfers to non-profi t social welfare associations and institutions in the areas of children, the disabled 
and the elderly; (iv) grants for R+D+I activities of entities inscribed in the register of technological centres and innovation 
support centres of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness; (v) transfers to local governments, provided 
that they had outstanding payment obligations eligible for inclusion in this tranche; and (vi) suppliers of universities.
16  The second tranche covered the following benefi ciaries: (i) works contracts, public works concessions, public services 
management, including the modalities of concession, services, supplies, cooperation between the public sector and 
the private sector; and private contracts for artistic and literary creation and interpretation or shows, in accordance with 
the consolidated text of the Public Sector Contracts Law; (ii) contracts under Law 31/2007 (water, energy, transport 
and postal services); (iii) property lease contracts; (iv) subsidies, within the framework of public procurement, for tariff 
rebates to the users of goods or services, in the portion fi nanced by regional government; (v) management contracts in 
which the commissioned entity has the status of a resource and technical service of the government; (vi) administrative 
licences; and (vii) compensated seizures.
17  Andalusia, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia, Murcia and 
the region of Valencia. Since December 2014 Extremadura has joined. The State can withhold fi nancing system funds 
from any regional government that misses payments to the Fund. Access to the FLA is subject to strict conditions. The 
member regional governments have to draft an adjustment plan to ensure they meet their individual defi cit and debt 
targets and repay the funds received. Disclosure requirements were also tightened, most notably to require regional 
governments to report more monthly information on their budget outturn and their treasury position and its impact on 
compliance with the adjustment plan. Control measures and plan monitoring were also strengthened.
18  The amount also included cofi nanced subsidies and those for dependency, local government and universities, and 
taxes and other.
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Thus, between 2012 and 2014, the FFPP and the FLA supplier facility paid outstanding 
invoices of local and regional governments amounting to €66.9 billion, of which €11.6 billion 
related to local government and €55.3 billion to regional government (see Tables 1 and 2 and 
Chart 5). Of the amounts disbursed by the FFPP, somewhat more than 50% was devoted to 
paying the invoices of large fi rms, nearly 50% to SMEs and 1% to the self-employed (see Chart 5, 
left-hand panel).
As a supplement to programmes of this type, different legislative measures were 
adopted to reduce structurally the payment periods of general government. Specifi cally, EU 
Directive 2011/7/EU aims to harmonise at European level the time taken by general government 
to pay companies and also shorten the payment periods between private sector fi rms. For 
dealings between general government and private sector fi rms it sets a payment period of 30 
days from receipt of the invoice or, if none, from receipt of the goods or services. This period 
may be extended in certain circumstances to 60 days. The Directive also establishes minimum 
fi nancial costs for general government if these deadlines are not met. In 2010 Spain enacted 
Law 15/2010 of 5 July 2010 amending Law 3/2004 of 29 December 2004 on measures to 
combat late payment of commercial transactions, which anticipated several of the measures 
subsequently included in the aforementioned Directive, particularly in relation to payment 
periods.19 The transposition was completed by Royal Decree-Law 4/2013 of 22 February 2013 
on measures to support entrepreneurs and stimulate growth and job creation.
Also, to strengthen compliance with this legislation, the law on control of trade debt in 
the public sector came into force in January 2014. This law amends the budgetary stability and 
fi nancial sustainability law so as to broaden the meaning of the principle of fi nancial sustainability 
to include trade debt in its scope, since under the budgetary stability and fi nancial sustainability 
law as originally drafted, the limits on public indebtedness only included the control of public 
debt as defi ned in the Excessive Defi cit Procedure, which as noted above, excludes trade credit. 
In addition, it obliges general government to make public its average supplier payment period 
and approves various measures which general government has to apply unilaterally when the 
permitted average payment periods are exceeded. Accordingly, the average payment period 
becomes a crucial tool within the framework of the budgetary stability and fi nancial sustainability 
law, which establishes a detailed monitoring and sanctioning procedure in the event of non-
compliance. Since September 2014 all tiers of general government have made public their 
average payment periods.
19  It came into force in January 2013.
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4 Impact on activity of supplier payment funds 
4.1 Channels
As noted in the introduction, the measures to reduce the government’s trade debt have entailed 
an injection of liquidity into fi rms and households and a normalisation of the time taken by 
general government to pay its suppliers which, against a background of widespread economic 
weakness, fi scal consolidation and diffi cult access to credit by economic agents, may have had 
a not insignifi cant impact on economic activity.
Quantifying this impact is, however, complex and it is fi rst necessary to identify the 
channels through which these effects act. For this purpose, it is useful to analyse the effect 
which may arise from default or late payment. Although deferred payment is normal in trade 
relationships, excessive lengthening of payment periods has harmful effects on the creditor 
company.20 Specifi cally, delaying collection on goods and services supplied causes problems in 
the fi nancing of the creditor company’s operations. This obliges it to resort to alternative means 
of fi nancing, including bank fi nancing or it in turn delaying payment to its suppliers. Against a 
backdrop of fi nancial constraint as in the recent crisis, these alternatives may not be available 
or they may be very costly, thus reducing fi rms’ profi tability and perhaps even jeopardising 
their liquidity, and ultimately resulting in lowered investment, delays in paying employees and, in 
extreme cases, closure of the fi rm.21 
The impact of lengthening the time taken to pay suppliers probably depends on fi rm 
size. Large fi rms are generally better equipped to mitigate the effect of delays in customer 
payments by passing on the trade credit fully or partly to their own creditors and being in a better 
position to negotiate alternative fi nancing with banks. Delayed payment is therefore probably 
more harmful when the creditors are small and medium-sized enterprises.
The macroeconomic effect of the various supplier payment programmes mentioned 
above thus comes about because they alleviate fi rms’ liquidity constraints. The fi nal effect will 
depend on whether the creditors take the plan as a mere early payment of amounts they expected 
to receive later, or whether this payment is unexpected, i.e. the economic agents did not expect 
to collect, at least partially, the trade accounts payable to them by general government. In this 
second case the expected multiplier effect will obviously be greater. The effect will also depend 
crucially on the use made by fi rms of the funds paid by the government. Generally fi rms will 
use these funds to repay bank loans, to pay possible arrears in their employees’ wages, to 
undertake investment or working capital projects postponed due to the initial lag in government 
payment or simply to increase their saving for precautionary reasons. The multiplier effect on the 
20  See Miranda Serrano (2008), Banco de España (2012) or Connel (2014).
21  Connel (2014) estimates that in a hypothetical scenario in which delays in general government payments to the business 
sector were reduced to zero, the fi rm shutdown rate would be reduced by somewhat more than 7%.
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economic activity of each of these uses will also differ. Generally the effect can be expected to 
be larger when the funds are used for investment in fi xed assets or working capital and smaller 
when they are used to repay bank loans, since in this case the effect on economic activity takes 
a more indirect path: the positive impact on investment will depend on the extent to which 
fi nancial institutions used the amounts to grant new loans. Similarly, if the fi nal use is to pay 
employees’ wage arrears, its short-term impact will depend on whether the amounts are used 
for consumption or saving.
Furthermore, the effects of these extraordinary supplier payment mechanisms may 
depend crucially on the macroeconomic setting in which they arise. Specifi cally, the signifi cant 
prior lengthening of regional and local government payment periods, against a backdrop of 
economic crisis and tight credit conditions in which general government was simultaneously 
engaged in a signifi cant fi scal adjustment, acted to magnify the positive effects of the provision 
of liquidity to economic agents under the Plan.
A proper analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the supplier payment plans would 
therefore require individual data on the fi rms (and households) affected and a knowledge of their 
credit restrictions and their decisions before and after the supplier payment measures were 
implemented. That information is naturally not available. There is, however, some disaggregated 
information on the use of funds which may help to approximate these effects. Specifi cally, the 
data provided by the Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (MHAP) show that 55% of 
payments from the supplier payment fund were to large fi rms (€23 billion), 43% to SMEs (€18 
billion) and the other 2% to self-employed persons (€0.8 billion). Those data also indicate that 
20.3% of payments by the supplier payment fund (around €6.1 billion) and 13.5% of the total 
payments22 from the FLA (around €3 billion) were made directly to fi nancial institutions.
Based on this information, the macroeconomic impact of supplier payment programmes 
is estimated below using two analysis tools. First, an illustrative empirical exercise based on a 
VAR model is conducted. Second, a series of simulations, including quantitative estimates, is 
performed using the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España. This enables 
us to characterise some of the channels through which the supplier payment mechanisms may 
have operated.
4.2  Estimation of the impact of supplier payment mechanisms using a VAR model
The most immediate effect of the various supplier payment plans has been to reduce the weight 
of general government trade credit relative to GDP. The impact of a change in trade credit as 
a proportion of the real GDP of the economy can be approximated, fi rstly, by a VAR model 
including the variables of interest in the analysis. A VAR model is a system of equations which 
takes each variable included as being endogeneous with respect to the others and is thus 
particularly appropriate for an analysis of these characteristics in which the causal relationships 
between the variables being analysed may run in different directions. 
22  Percentage of the total payments from the FLA, and not just of the amounts used by it for supplier payments.
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The fact that the sample has a suffi cient, although not prolifi c, number of observations, 
would advise a gradual approach to the phenomenon under study. Hence the variables included 
in the basic VAR model used are general government trade credit, real GDP and government 
expenditure. The variable used to represent trade credit is general government accounts 
payable to non-fi nancial corporations. The level of government expenditure (in logarithms) is 
also included in the model to control for the fact that an increase in government expenditure 
may be associated with increased trade credit, since the latter consists of a delay in payment 
of the former (see Checherita et al., 2015).23 However, against a background in which general 
government has limited access to fi nancial markets, the relationship between these variables 
could reverse if general government responded to this situation by simultaneously cutting 
government expenditure (fi scal adjustment) and delaying payment to suppliers.
The following additional variables are also included in alternative specifi cations: the 
infl ation rate (measured by the GDP defl ator), a measure of the cost of the fi nancing needed 
to cover the operating needs it was intended to cover with the trade credit (for which a 3-year 
interest rate is used), a measure of the degree of fi nancial tightness of the economy (through 
the volume of loans from the fi nancial sector to the non-fi nancial private sector, excluding 
house purchase loans to households) and a measure of the fi nancial situation of the business 
sector (proxied by the real gross value added of the market economy). The sample available to 
estimate the models consists of quarterly data and covers the period 1995Q1-2013Q4.
The upper panels of Chart 6 show the impulse-response functions24 of real GDP 
and trade credit (both variables are in logarithms) when there is an unexpected decrease 
(shock) in the latter variable.25 The model dynamics behave as expected. GDP responds by 
increasing from the fi rst quarter in which the shock occurs and continues to rise persistently 
in the ensuing periods.26 Also, the decrease in trade credit is accompanied by increased 
government expenditure (bottom panels of the chart). Thus, according to this model, a (3-
year cumulated) decrease of 1% in trade credit would give rise to an increase in real GDP 
of around 0.2 pp.27 These estimates are subject to high uncertainty in view of the wide 
confi dence bands. In terms of the ratio of trade credit to government expenditure (see lower 
right-hand panel of Chart 6), a shock of this size to trade credit would reduce that ratio by 
2.5 pp to 9.9% in 3-year cumulated terms, if the starting point is taken as its value in 2011 
Q4 (12.4%).
23  Unlike real GDP, which is taken from the Quarterly National Accounts, trade credit and government expenditure are not 
seasonally adjusted. These two variables are thus seasonally adjusted using the TRAMO/SEATS program.
24  The Chart depicts the generalised impulse-response functions of Pesaran and Shin (1998), which are robust to the ordering 
of the variables in the VAR. The confi dence bands are calculated by asymptotic methods. A constant and a linear trend 
are included in all specifi cations. The VAR lag structure is determined employing the usual statistical criteria (AIC and SIC).
25  The initial shock is equivalent to one standard deviation of the variable. The path of trade credit in Chart 6 has been 
normalised to show a cumulative change of 1% so that the panels are simpler to read. 
26  In the model, moreover, trade credit exhibits high persistence, i.e. an initial reduction in trade credit generates decreases 
in the following quarters, so the total shock received by the economy is bigger than the initial one. For this reason the 
results should be analysed in cumulative terms, as in the chart.
27 The stock of trade credit is not signifi cantly affected by a shock to GDP, in keeping with the results of the model.
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Based on these results, an estimate can be made of how GDP would be affected by 
the decrease in trade credit associated with the supplier payment plan. Specifi cally, according to 
the information in Chart 3, the ratio of all general government accounts payable to non-fi nancial 
corporations (our measure of trade credit in VAR) to government expenditure decreased by 
nearly 4.5 pp between 2011 Q4 and end-2013.28 If it is assumed that all the change in this 
ratio is due to supplier payment programmes, based on the estimate obtained from the model 
and given that this is linear, the positive impact of these programmes on real GDP may be 
around 0.36 pp of GDP in 3-year cumulated terms. The most recent information, relating to 
2014 Q3, shows general government accounts payable to non-fi nancial corporations expressed 
as a percentage of government expenditure fell by 6.9 pp from 2011 Q4, which would raise 
the cumulative impact on GDP to 0.55 pp of GDP. These estimates do not, however, take into 
account the possibility that the funds made available may have had differing impacts on the 
economy, depending on whether they were paid directly to fi nancial institutions, on the size of 
the recipient fi rms and on other factors. In addition, the dynamics of government expenditure in 
this period was determined by numerous factors. 
If the VAR model is expanded to incorporate the additional variables mentioned above, 
the estimate of the impact generally remains valid.29
4.3  Estimation of the impact of supplier payment mechanisms through simulations with 
the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España
As an alternative to the above VAR-based analysis, we estimate below the impact of the 
supplier payment plan on the main macroeconomic variables by making use of the Quarterly 
Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España. Specifi cally, as a means of including the 
various channels mentioned in earlier sections, the supplier payment plan is simulated as an 
increase in transfers from the public sector to households and fi rms, and through an increase 
in the credit available in the economy, for the various quarters in which payments were made 
between 2012 Q2 and 2014 Q4. 
Chart 6 shows the annual size of these payments in the period 2012-2014. The amounts 
reached around 3.2% of GDP in 2012, 1.2% of GDP in 2013 and 1.9% of GDP in 2014. To put 
these fi gures into perspective, the same chart also shows the reduction in the structural primary 
defi cit by general government in the same period, according to European Commission estimates. 
Specifi cally, this reduction amounted to 3.1 pp, 1.6 pp and 0.2 pp of GDP in 2012, 2013 and 
2014, respectively. The supplier payment plan was implemented in parallel with the process of 
fi scal consolidation. It can be expected that the implementation of the plan has helped to mitigate 
to some extent the adverse effects on short-term economic growth usually associated with the 
application of adjustment measures, irrespective of its positive long-term effects.
28  Latest annual government expenditure fi gure available on the cut-off date of this article.
29  Also, it is found that reducing trade credit improves the fi nancial situation of the business sector (as measured by the 
real gross value added of the market economy). The sign of the interest rate response is also as expected, as there is 
a cumulative decrease in response to a cumulative decrease in trade credit.
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The diffi culties in using a macroeconomic model to estimate the impact of the supplier 
payment fund are, however, numerous. In principle, we do not have an accurate knowledge of 
the fi nal use of the funds or of how they are used by the various agents, so various assumptions 
have to be made to carry out the simulations. 
An initial simulation (scenario 1) is performed under the following assumptions. First, 
it is necessary to allocate the amounts of the plan funds according to their use by economic 
agents (fi nancial institutions, households and fi rms), given that, as indicated in Section 4.1, the 
expected impact depends crucially on this factor. Specifi cally, under scenario 1 it is assumed 
that all the amounts paid by supplier payment fi nancing funds and the FLA directly to fi nancial 
institutions do not increase household income, but rather raise the availability of credit in the 
economy. Specifi cally, on the available information it can be estimated that around 17.6% of the 
total funds, about €11,756 million, were paid directly to credit institutions. As noted above, the 
economic activity multiplier derived from this part of the funds is expected to be lower, given 
that the effect depends on the extent to which this higher available credit is used by fi nancial 
institutions to grant more credit and, in turn, depends also on how fi rms and households used 
this fresh credit granted to them.
Under this fi rst scenario it is also assumed that, disregarding the aforementioned 
amounts, all the payments of supplier payment fi nancing funds to individuals and half of 
the payments of supplier payment fi nancing funds and the FLA to SMEs correspond under 
the model to a transfer to households. The other payments of supplier payment fi nancing 
funds and the FLA to SMEs and large fi rms are considered as injections into fi rms. According 
to these assumptions, around 60% of the total funds entailed a transfer to fi rms and the 
remainder to households.
Under this fi rst scenario it is also assumed that the main effect of the plan is to bring 
forward the payment of amounts which creditors of general government expected to receive 
late but which they had not written off. Subsequently, this assumption, which has important 
implications in terms of the macroeconomic effects simulated with the model, will be relaxed. 
Additionally, it is assumed that after the transfer relating to payment of arrears, households keep 
their saving rate unchanged, i.e. that the percentage of these payments that they save is equal 
to what they were saving before the transfer. This assumption, which increases the consumer 
response to shocks which raise disposable income, is intended to describe the situation of 
economic crisis in which the plan was carried out and in which agents encountered more 
liquidity constraints.
Chart 8 summarises the estimated impact on GDP and employment for the period 
2012-2014. The results obtained suggest that the supplier payment plan had a cumulative 
positive effect on GDP of 0.3 pp to 2014. The effect on employment was 0.4 pp. This resulted 
from increased consumption and, above all, from increased private productive investment. The 
increase in imports derived from the increase in domestic demand seems to have neutralised 
part of the expansionary effect of the plan.
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In a second simulation (scenario 2), all the foregoing assumptions are maintained, with 
the difference that the impact of the plan is generated not only through the bringing-forward 
of the creditors’ expected collection date, but also because a portion of this collection is 
unexpected, i.e. the economic agents expected that they would not collect a percentage of 
their trade accounts receivable from general government. An unexpected transfer from general 
government to private agents naturally has a higher multiplier effect on activity. Specifi cally, 
under this scenario 2, the positive effect of the plan increases to 0.6 pp of GDP in cumulative 
terms to 2014 and to 0.7 pp of employment.
In short, the above results confi rm the plan’s positive effects on activity, although 
they also illustrate the diffi culty in accurately quantifying the size of these effects, given that 
the channels through which it presumably operates can only be captured imperfectly and 
approximately in the available macroeconomic models.30 
30  In a similar exercise using the REMS model, the BBVA Research Department estimated that the impact of the fi rst 
supplier payment plan ranged from 0.4 pp to 1 pp of GDP in the fi rst year, depending of the use of the funds and on 
the percentage of constrained agents (See BBVA, 2012).
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5 Conclusions
The initiatives taken by the central government from 2012 to reduce the trade debt of regional 
and local governments enabled their stock of outstanding debt and the time taken to pay 
suppliers to be restored to normal. Successive plans have unblocked payments and channelled 
nearly €67 billion of funds to the private sector in somewhat less than three years. 
Since these mechanisms have were implemented after a signifi cant increase in 
regional and local government payment periods and against a background of severe economic 
weakness, fi scal consolidation and tight credit, they seem to have acted as a stimulus on 
private agents and the economy as a whole, helping to mitigate some of the adverse effects of 
the economic crisis. The various estimates presented in this study confi rm a signifi cant positive 
impact on activity although it is complex to estimate its size accurately, given the variety of 
channels on which plans of this type may operate and the diffi culty in capturing them with the 
available macroeconomic models.
As a whole, the measures implemented have proved highly effective in providing 
liquidity to the suppliers of local and regional government, the outstanding invoices payable of 
which increased signifi cantly during the economic crisis. Simultaneously, they entailed a major 
increase in local and regional government indebtedness to the State. To prevent this kind of 
aid from generating inappropriate incentives in the behaviour of local and regional government, 
the fi nancing mechanisms agreed envisage the fulfi lment of adjustment plans. It is now crucial 
to require strict observance of those plans.
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a Does not include accounts payable to other general government units.
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SOURCES: Banco de España and MHAP.
a 2014 data relates to the third quarter of the year. 2014 GDP is the aggregation of the quarterly GDP of the last four quarters available.
b Excluding accounts payable to other general government units.
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